Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory

Abstract

Zweigert and KoStz's An Introduction to Comparative Law, an English translation of which was published in 1977, has been described as 'indisputably one of the masterpieces of comparative law literature'.' Ten years on a second edition has appeared,2 and although the authors have had to undertake revision in the light of recent developments, the structure of the work has remained substantially unchanged. Volume I provides an introduction to the nature of comparative law, and the world's major legal systems; the second volume attempts a comparative analysis of the law of obligations (contract, unjust enrichment and tort), with particular reference to Germanic, Romanistic and Anglo-American legal systems. As with the first edition, it is impossible to fault either the authors' scholarship or the elegance of the translation. Nevertheless, Zweigert and K6tz's An Introduction to Comparative Law reveals a number of theoretical problems which underlie the whole enterprise of comparative law. Comparative law has suffered from 'a surfeit of methodology and self-inspection'.3 Although comparatists have indulged in seemingly endless discussion not only over what comparative law is, but over whether it can be said to exist at all, the range of theoretical issues which comparative lawyers have traditionally considered tends to be narrowly circumscribed. In this article it is proposed to consider four wider questions which are raised by Zweigert and K6itz's work. (I) Is it possible to justify the role which comparative law is said to play in the field of law reform? (II) Does comparative law involve an acceptance of certain assumptions about the role of law in society? (III) To what extent is comparative law influenced by the political climate? (IV) What contribution, if any, can comparative law make in the realm of legal theory?