Abstract
Comparative study is significant for the reform of corporate governance in transitional economies like China. Influenced by the Berle- Means problem, this kind of study is usually under the auspices of the agency theory. However, besides the agency theory, another important theoretical framework to examine corporate governance is transaction cost economics. Based on transaction cost economics, it demonstrates that the governance structure of Japanese vertical keiretsu may promote the enforcement of relational contract other than the function to monitor the performance of managers. This understanding has positive implications for the Venture Capital (VC)-backed strategic alliances in China.
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