Abstract
Previous theoretical analysis suggested that group heterogeneity facilitates collective action because agents with high stakes in a public good are also endowed with large amounts of wealth and thus will have greater incentives to contribute voluntarily to the public good. Results from this empirical study of Amazonian fishing communities do not support these former theoretical predictions. When increased wealth stratification was associated with greater availability of alternative economic opportunities, wealthier households chose not to contribute proportionally to the additional costs of a conservationist scheme. Organizational contributions were non-proportional or negatively correlated to household wealth in communities with less developed or failed management institutions. Larger and more homogenous communities were able to enforce rules about proportional contributions by their members and to bear the cost of creating and maintaining a fully developed local management institution.
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