Abstract

We advance theorizing on the governance of the commons through a configurative comparative analysis (CCA) of community control in the housing commons. We focus our analysis on community land trusts (CLTs), which are increasingly recognised as a potential governance mechanism for collective access to housing provision for low-income communities. Through systematic comparative analysis of CLTs in the US and UK, we extend the existing evidence base and develop a conceptual typology of community control in the housing commons. The typology suggests that whilst some social purposes for CLTs may align with notions of the commons – enrichment of community politics, conservation of community life, or creation of participatory governance – other CLTs focus on housing provision as a means of making a broader contribution to the social economy, or as an asset-lock to enable wider provision for affordable housing. By understanding this differentiation, we challenge the assumption that design principles or governance mechanisms are sufficient for or inherently offer a singly clear route to community control, and recognise that community control is achieved through different pathways informed by the multiple configurations of dynamics between different aspects of governance, as usefully illuminated by CCA. Our approach demonstrates the value to scholarship and activism on the commons of systematic comparative analysis in order to interrogate the expansion of the commons not only in practice but in spirit.

Highlights

  • In emphasising community control of resources, commoning offers an alternative to state capture or market speculation

  • We offer a systematic advance in theorizing the multiple combinations of conditions that shape self-governance of the new commons

  • Our analysis focused on community land trusts (CLTs), which are increasingly used as a legal and practical mechanism to bring housing under community control

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

In emphasising community control of resources, commoning offers an alternative to state capture or market speculation. Hardin (1968) focused on pasture overgrazing to demonstrate the ‘tragedy’ of the commons, where rivalry, free-riding and exploitation undermined the sustainability of common pool resources These dilemmas of collective action foregrounded Ostrom’s response, where she addressed the arrangements that allow for self-governance – or community control – of the commons (1990). CLTs potentially offer an example of a common property regime that emphasises common land stewardship, ‘resisting traditional land speculations and development practices through the mitigation or halting of land value inflation’ (Bunce, 2016), and may fulfill definitions of self-governing arrangements as: ‘social system[s] for the long-term stewardship of resources that preserves shared values and community identity’ We outline our configurative comparative analysis of CLTs

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