Abstract

As De Angelis, Federici, and others have noted, there are “no commons without community.” The concept of community, however (as, among others, Jean‐Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito have shown), has a dark history continuing up until today, when extreme right‐wing or even downright fascist appropriations of the concept have understood it as a static and identitarian unity bound to a specific territory or ethnicity. While commons‐scholars try to circumvent this legacy by emphasizing the commons as a “praxis” (Dardot and Laval) or “organizational principle” (De Angelis), they thereby tend to neglect the important cultural and symbolic connotations of the concept of community (which, in part, seem to make right‐wing movements appealing for certain segments of the population). In my article, I want to raise the following question: Do we need a sense of community for a politics of the commons, and, if so, what concept of community should it be? To answer this question, I will refer back to the use of the concept of “common sense” (<em>sensus communis</em>) in Immanuel Kant’s <em>Critique of Judgment</em>. Characteristic of Kant’s use of the term is that it does not refer to an actually existing community, but rather to an imaginary community that is anticipated in our (aesthetic) judgment. Common sense, in other words, involves “acting as if”—with the dual dimensions of <em>acting</em> (i.e., the community is based in praxis) and <em>as if</em> (an imagined, anticipated community bordering between the fictional and the real).

Highlights

  • Despite, or perhaps precisely because of its long and, at times, dark history, the concept of “community” contin‐ ues to concern us

  • I will argue that the con‐ cept of community that belongs to the politics of the commons is a “dissensual community,” revolving around an “acting as if,” with the dual emphasis on acting and as if, that borders between the fic‐ tional and the real

  • In mentioning the “aesthetic” moment in community, I am not referring to the “aestheticization of politics” that Walter Benjamin associated with fascism

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Summary

Introduction

Perhaps precisely because of its long and, at times, dark history, the concept of “community” contin‐ ues to concern us. The first is, obvi‐ ously, the rise of extreme right‐wing or downright neo‐ fascist movements that mobilize the concept to funnel discontent These movements understand community as a clearly delineated and identifiable unity bound to a specific territory or ethnicity—a unity that is under con‐ stant threat from hostile elements, either from outside or from within. From environmentalism to the “right to the city,” and from creative commons and “copyleft” on the internet to land reform and the redistribution of wealth—all of these can be considered as forms of resis‐ tance against the enclosure, appropriation, or destruc‐ tion of the commons and attempt to, in Klein’s (2001) words, “reclaim the commons.” This phrase of “reclaiming,” immediately raises the question of who should own the commons, or “govern” them (Ostrom, 1990). I will argue that the con‐ cept of community that belongs to the politics of the commons is a “dissensual community,” revolving around an “acting as if,” with the dual emphasis on acting (i.e., a community based on praxis) and as if (an imaginary, anticipated community), that borders between the fic‐ tional and the real

Ontology and Praxis
Common Sense
Dissensual and Liminal Community
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