Abstract

The 1975 victories of communist in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos seemed to presage the realization of ASEAN's* worst case scenario to the adherents of the domino theory of geostrategy. ASEAN's strategic frontier became the Thai border with Laos and Cambodia and along the disputed overlapping maritime and continental shelf jurisdictions in the South China Sea. A psychological boost was given to the long-embattled people's armies of the communist insurgent movements within the ASEAN states. The capabilities of the now ruling communist parties of Southeast Asia to provide direct assistance to fraternal parties seemed enhanced. Furthermore, the security implications of the Nixon Doctrine appeared more ominous with the American defeat in Vietnam and subsequent drawdown of the American power presence in the region. Today, it is very obvious that the ASEAN dominoes have not been toppled. In fact, with the exception of the Philippines, internal security conditions within the ASEAN states have actually improved

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