Communism and Reform in the Philippines

Abstract

I N THE EVENING of September 22, I972, President Ferdinand Marcos formally put into effect his Proclamation No. io8i, placing Philippines under martial law in conformity with powers granted him under constitution. In an address to his nation on September 23, Marcos emphasized that this was a military take-over of civilian government functions and that government of Republic was established by our people in 1946 . . . officials and employees of our national and civil government continue in office and must discharge their duties as before within limits of situation.' However, he added, there is no doubt in everybody's mind that a state of rebellion exists in Philippines, referring not only to and criminality, ranging from kidnapping and extortion, to gun-running and corruption, but also to battles . .. going on between elements of our government forces and subversives in islands of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. He warned that if this continues then the economy of country will collapse in a short time. This address was remarkable because of attempt to link alleged lawlessness with threat of subversion, specifically that of Maoist New People's Army (NPA). Both of these were invoked to justify not merely imposition of martial law, but also flood of ambitious reform measures, which Marcos announced then and in subsequent days in an effort to remove the inequities of society, to clean up government with its corrupt and sterile elements, to begin liquidation of criminal syndicates, and so on. Whether joining of problem of Philippine criminality with that of Communist insurgency was warranted is obviously debatable; one might ask whether in early sixties (when Huk problem seemed much smaller and radical ideological component much less