Abstract
This paper considers two-player normal form games where each player can send a payoff-irrelevant message prior to play. Let G be the game without communication, and G ∗ ( M) the extended game with message set M. Any convex combination of Nash outcomes in G can be approximated in a subgame perfect equilibrium of G ∗ ( M) for some M. Furthermore, every symmetric game has a symmetric subgame perfect communication equilibrium that is undominated in a limit sense as the message set is enlarged.
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