Abstract

AbstractDominant explanations for variation in performance between state organizations focus on macro-level factors, such as political support, and meso-level factors, such as civil service capacity. However, these factors cannot account for why different groups within the same state organization perform better than others. I leverage a comparative analysis of state officials working under particularly challenging circumstances—task forces of prosecutors investigating high-level corruption in Brazil—to develop a framework to explain how small-group communication and decision-making processes affect performance. Drawing on document analysis and 124 original interviews with federal investigators, I argue that, even when we account for macro- and meso-level factors, prosecutors performed better when they cultivated frequent communication and collective decision-making. This study shows the mechanisms through which these processes affect performance: while frequent communication enables group members to generate knowledge connections that help them make unforeseen discoveries, collective decision-making helps build defensive alignment, which allows members to protect the group from external pressures and manage internal tensions.

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