Communal Violence in Singapore

Abstract

The violent eruption of communal strife between Malays and Chinese in Singapore in July and September of this year resulted in thirtythree deaths and some six hundred injuries. Nor was the damage confined to these victims. All Malaysians were potentially affected by the reactivation of a factor in Singapore politics which had long been regarded as latent. Murderous clashes between Malays and Chinese were sparked off in the course of a procession to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of the prophet Mohammed. Religious celebrations are notorious in plural societies as occasions of low boiling point. The heightened fervor of such times can easily induce attitudes of religious chauvinism towards non-believers. Other causal factors, however, appear to have been involved in the Singapore disturbances. It was reported that on the eve of the riots, leaflets urging Malays to kill Chinese were distributed in the city.' These leaflets were said to have borne the label 'Singapore Malay National Action Committee.' This body, set up earlier in July, was sponsored by members of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in the multi-racial coalition which controls the Federal Government of Malaysia. Indeed, there is reason to believe that prominent figures in UMNO, including its secretary-general, have been actively engaged in a campaign of agitation among Malays in Singapore with the ostensible object of securing special benefits for their co-religionists. It would probably be nearer the truth to say that these activities were part of a deliberate design to embarrass, if not to remove, the Chinese-dominated People's Action Party (PAP) government in Singapore which is regarded by many in UMNO as a threat to continued Malay pre-eminence in Malaysia's political life. The dangerous consequences of playing communal politics are evidenced by Singapore's bloody days in July and September. An even greater danger is that, at a time when the new Federation is facing the external menace of Indonesian 'confrontation,' any exploitation of communal feeling, which could well spread, can only benefit Malaysia's enemies. Up to the time of the incorporation of Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963, political life was overshadowed by a struggle for power within the majority Chinese community.2 Malay representation was secured through the Singapore branch of UMNO and, to an extent,