Commons, Regulation, and Rent-Seeking Behavior: The Dilemma of Pakistan's "Guzara" Forests

Abstract

curred over past 120 years. These forests, known locally as guzara forests, can be characterized as regulated commons. The regulation, by placing quantitative restrictions on felling, aimed at an orderly exploitation of these forests. On surface, failure of regulation seems to be a simple case of enforcement failure. However, a closer look reveals a fairly complex picture in which factors such as delineation of property rights and rent-seeking behavior of those subject to regulation as well as of regulators themselves have contributed to problems of these forests. The evidence presented in this article shows that way regulation was devised gave rise to a discordant structure of property rights involving government and local inhabitants. Despite early signals that it could not be effectively enforced, no rectifying change was introduced in structure of rights, which has persisted into postcolonial era. Indeed, there was a reversal of some potentially beneficial institutional changes that had been introduced toward end of colonial period. While process of degradation was set in motion by discordances that arose in process of delineating property rights, it is theory of rentseeking behavior that provides an adequate explanation of its persistence as well as of subsequent reversals. An effective response to problem of guzara forests must take account of two additional features in regulation of these forests. First, in addition to common property externality that leads to the tragedy of commons, these forests also display interjurisdictional externality by virtue of their location. Second, a common