Commons, anti-commons, and in-betweens

Abstract

The idea of anti-commons (re)-introduced by Heller (Harv Law Rev 111(3):621–688, 1998) has led to numerous studies and the concept has been stretched to cover scenarios of different natures including those of commons: in particular, the closed storefronts in Moscow. These closed storefronts are plausibly the result of rent seeking—with each and every approval-granting bureaucrat seeking favors, finally depleting the pool of potential resources (potential bribes). This is actually a case of commons, as opposed to the case of Indian reservations where a large number of owners makes it difficult to utilize the resources collectively and efficiently. The first goal of the present study is to clarify the concept of anti-commons. Secondly, we provide a critique of the milestone model of Buchanan and Yoon (J Law Econ 43(1):1–13, 2000) and argue that the earlier model of Buchanan and Tullock (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) is more compatible with both the commons (employing the any-person rule in resource allocation decisions) and anti-commons (using the unanimity rule). Finally, an in-between case is identified where the barriers posed by the chain of regulatory agencies are overcome by following the latent rule of “An over-flying goose leaves behind some of its feathers”. Preliminary empirical evidence is presented to support this claim.