Abstract

The author (a) analyses the way in which first the General Court and then the Court of Justice, with reference to an appeal by Poland against a decision of the Commission concerning the energy sector, have ruled on the relationship between the general principle of solidarity and that of energy solidarity, (b) points out, in this respect, the reasons why the Court’s ruling, despite the appearance resulting from a brief point of it, should be understood as meaning that the Commission’s decision was in- compatible with the principle of energy solidarity. In addition to these observations, he points out that the Court, in its judgment, (a) concretely shared the opinion contained in the Advocate General’s Opinion, according to which the legal effects of the fundamental or constitutional principles of the Union’s legal system are intended to be understood “by those who must interpret them (ultimately the Court of Justice)” and (b) ruled out the possibility that the principle of energy solidarity constitutes an application of the principle of sincere cooperation, holding only that the former must be “read in conjunction” with the latter.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call