Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico's Pastoral "Ejidatarios"

Abstract

The election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 initiated a process of privatization in Mexico's financial and industrial sectors. Banks, state-controlled during most of the 1980s, were reprivatized by reducing the controlling interest of the central government and encouraging recapitalization by the private sector. State-owned industries such as airlines and mines were sold to private investors in an effort to improve efficiency and reduce demands on the public treasury. Also, an increased inflow of foreign investment capital, to be stimulated by legal changes allowing increased foreign private ownership, is now viewed by the Salinas de Gortari administration as a necessary condition for Mexico's future economic growth and stability. In January of 1992, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended to facilitate the modernization of Mexican agriculture. Two economic conditions help explain this action. First, Mexico is a net importer of agricultural commodities. In some years beans and corn, staples in the Mexican diet, must be imported to meet the demands of a burgeoning population. Second, 50% of the agricultural land in Mexico is controlled by organized community groups: comunidades and ejidos. Ejidos, groups that hold property in common, control approximately 40% of the agricultural land. On average, these lands are 30%50% less productive than comparable private farms and represent, according to some Mexican analysts, an opportunity for increased productivity through privatization.1 The ejido is an important component in Mexico's culture and historical heritage. Its revolutionary past, deeply rooted in the Mexican Revolution of 1910-15, should give pause to the reformer who argues for privatizing these common property land holdings. Questions should