Abstract

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.

Highlights

  • Common pool resource (CPR) institutions have been the subject of extensive research for several decades

  • If Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NeDNR) and Natural Resource Districts (NRDs) are in dispute, the matter may be taken to the Interrelated Water Review Board

  • The Ground Water Management and Protection Act (GWMPA) mandates that NeDNR and NRDs jointly progress toward meeting IMP goals and objectives (§46-715(3))

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Summary

Introduction

Common pool resource (CPR) institutions have been the subject of extensive research for several decades. A CPR is defined as a consumable resource where it is difficult to exclude users and where one person’s use depletes the pool for others [1]. Much of this commentary has focused on what the literature calls the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for actors to overexploit natural resources such as water, fisheries, and grazing forage in the absence of norms and rules developed by users to govern sustainable use [1,2] and her colleagues argued that while regulation by an external authority is necessary in some circumstances, empirical evidence shows that individual users can overcome self-interest and avert a “tragedy of the commons” through collective action [3]. In examining this framework, we relied on Ostrom’s design principles for common pool resource institutions, because of its “bottom-up” perspective. NeDNR and the NRDs are jointly responsible for facilitating the development of integrated water management plans

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