Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct. Empirical evidence indicates that common institutional blockholders (institutional blockholders with multiple blockholdings), with advantages in information, experience and resources, can effectively inhibit corporate misconduct. Furthermore, the inhibitory effect is stronger in firms prone to commit misconduct. Empirical results also support the role of state blockholders with multiple blockholdings and common institutional blockholders with high ownership proportions in restraining corporate misconduct. This paper contributes to the heated debate on the economic implications of common ownership and provides additional evidence for the role of common blockholders in Chinese capital markets.
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