Abstract
This paper studies competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partners. To explain the strategic interaction between governments and regulators, we present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods and product market regulation affects the number of firms in the market. We provide empirical evidence based on data for 21 OECD countries over the 1990-2008 period. Our results suggest that commodity taxation and product market regulation are interdependent policies. We confirm the absence of strategic interaction in commodity taxation between governments. Finally, we show that domestic regulation has a negative effect on domestic commodity taxation and that product market regulation is a strategic complement policy.
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