Commodification arguments for the legal prohibition of organ sale.

Abstract

The commercial trading of human organs, along with various related activities (for example, advertising) was criminalised throughout Great Britain under the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989. This paper critically assesses one type of argument for this, and similar, legal prohibitions: commodification arguments. Firstly, the term 'commodification' is analysed. This can be used to refer to either social practices or to attitudes. Commodification arguments rely on the second sense and are based on the idea that having a commodifying attitude to certain classes of thing (e.g. bodies or persons) is wrong. The commodifying attitude consists of three main elements: denial of subjectivity, instrumentality, and fungibility. Secondly, in the light of this analysis, the claim that organ sale involves commodifying the human body is examined. This claim is found to be plausible but insufficient to ground an argument against organ sale, because the very same commodifying attitude is likely to be present in cases of (unpaid) organ donation. It is also argued that commodifying bodies per se may not be wrong. Thirdly, the view that organ sale involves commodifying persons is examined. Although this and the claim that it is wrong to commodify persons are probably true, there is--it is argued--little reason to regard organ sale as worse in this respect than other widely accepted practices, such as the buying and selling of labour. The conclusion is that although commodification is a useful ethical concept and although commodification arguments may sometimes be successful, the commodification argument against organ sale is not persuasive. This is not to say, though, that there are no arguments for prohibition--simply that this particular justificatory strategy is flawed.