Committed Perception

Abstract

My goal in this essay to explore how viewers perceive and connect with performing art. Aristotle framed this issue by arguing that spectator identifies with stage artist's This question now widely debated in philosophy of film. Among contemporary philosophers, Noel Carroll has argued against Aristotelian position, submitting that viewers cannot truly identify with characters. Carroll proposes a different, asymmetric theory of emotion, which in his view better accounts for viewers' commitment to a given performance. A prolific philosopher, Carroll has written much this topic and his insights are undeniably valuable. Yet, as important as Carroll's contribution is, I find his argument for why viewers are engaged by a particular film or character incomplete. I wish to argue that Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied subjectivity gives us a better picture of this phenomenon. I will first outline Carroll's objections to classical theory of emotion and his suggested alternative. I will then turn my attention to Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied subjectivity. In concluding segment of this essay, in support of Merleau-Pontyian approach, I will turn my attention to Iranian Cinema and its unique use of child actors. Carroll Emotions In Carroll's view, film theory does not pay sufficient attention to role that emotions play in keeping us glued to screen.1 He readily acknowledges that psychoanalysis, an important perspective for many film theorists, is concerned with emotions. But Carroll argues that psychoanalytic critics seem more concerned with certain generic ill-defined forces like desire and pleasure that they speak of without prepositional modification. For example, they write of Desire with a capital 'D', rather than of small -d desires for this or that.2 Though his position regarding psychoanalysis debatable, strength of Carroll's position in his revision of classical theories of emotion. In a nutshell, Carroll maintains that a strong sense of character-identificationthe Aristotelian theory-would imply a symmetrical relation of identity between emotions of spectators and characters. But generally, relation asymmetrical; characters, in part through their emotions, cause different emotions in spectators.3 As captivated and lost as we can be in a movieand Carroll's main argument against theory of identification came in his work horror, a genre which clearly requires viewer's attunement-we do not share character's exact same In a horror movie, the character presumably believes that she being attacked by a werewolf, but audience member does not.4 Better yet, in many horror movies, a good deal of viewer's experience based seeing monster lurking, preying innocent people, who go about their business, ignorant of their horrific fate. We know this; most characters do not, making a full identification with those characters impossible. Nor do we fully identify with monster, whose reasons and motivations are beyond us. To go back to Aristotle's favorite genre, if we feel pity at Oedipus' recognition that he has killed his father and bedded his mother, that not what Oedipus feeling. He feeling guilt, remorse, and self-recrimination. And, needless to say, we are feeling none of these.5 In addition to an asymmetry of experiences, there also an asymmetry of knowledge. Carroll argues that audience members in general know more than characters do. We have a quasi-omniscient perspective. We simply have more information than most characters. We cannot take on their emotions: When we are happy at end of movie because lovers have finally gotten together, that not a function of fact that we are in love with characters. Which one of characters would it be, anyway? Both? But if we are in love with both characters, then we are in an emotional state that neither of characters in, since each of them only in love with one person. …