Comments on ‘Some methodological issues in biosurveillance’

Abstract

Rarely does one get to be a participant in the frontier of a new discipline or area of research. But since 9/11 the field of syndromic surveillance has provided public health researchers and practitioners just such an opportunity. Some of the $5 billion in funds awarded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) during fiscal years 2002– 2007 to states, territories, and several large local jurisdictions to enhance public health capacities to detect, respond to, and recover from bioterrorism events have been allocated to expanding or improving surveillance systems [1]. These expansions have included developing public health capabilities in the area of biosurveillance and its sub-field, syndromic surveillance. The aim of these new systems is to use near ‘real-time’ data and automated tools to detect and characterize outbreaks (natural or intentional) before conventional methods. Several systems have become popular for use by state and local health jurisdictions in conducting these syndromic surveillance activities, including the Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS), BioSense, and the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community Based Epidemics (ESSENCE II) [2--4]. In the initial years of implementing syndromic surveillance systems, state and local health departments used the applications primarily to detect bioterrorism-related events [5]. However, due to developing needs, the public health community has applied biosurveillance more broadly to other situations, including influenza and fire-related illness surveillance, as well as to affirm the absence of outbreaks after a disaster [6]. In Monterey County, California, we have had similar needs and particularly wanted a program that we could use for local purposes. We began using EARS in 2005 because of its flexibility for developing syndrome definitions and applied it to a variety of situations, from daily ongoing surveillance for influenza-like illness to emerging situations such as respiratory syndromes potentially associated with an aerial spraying of pesticide (Monterey County, unpublished data). The field is young, and Fricker (this issue) is timely in his advocacy for the standardization of terms and methods used for biosurveillance and particularly syndromic surveillance. Public health practitioners should support such standardization and have outlined areas for further research and evaluation [7]. An equally pressing issue is the statistical methods that are currently used for biosurveillance. Fricker does an admirable job of summarizing how methodologies from the field of industrial statistical process control have been adapted for use in detecting attacks by terrorists on the health of a population. A comprehensive understanding of bioterrorism is relatively recent in the literature and, for research purposes, the number of modern bioterrorist events that resulted in actual cases have been few [8]. However, there has been an apparent recent increase in the use of biological agents with 40 of 56 confirmed criminal cases and 19 of 27 confirmed terrorist cases in the 20th century occurring in the 1990s [8]. While these provide a relative paucity of events for modeling purposes and for developing effective syndromic surveillance methods, they underscore the necessity of surveillance methods that can be used to improve time to event detection and to help ensure that a bioterrorist attack is detected. This is likely why there appears to be general support in public health for an expansion of syndromic and other public health surveillance systems. The majority of public health jurisdictions surveyed in the United States use some form of syndromic surveillance [5]. Internationally, the World Health Organization revised the International Health Regulations in 2007 to include the concept of syndromic surveillance as part of an expanded traditional disease notification system. May et al. [9] provide a review of its uses in developing nations. There is a national recognition of the potential usefulness and importance for developing syndromic surveillance systems. In December 2009, proposed regulations were released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the United States defining ‘meaningful use’ of electronic health records (EHR). In addition, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology released an interim final rule describing the required certification standards