Abstract
Larry Wall and Bob Eisenbeis provide a useful framework for thinking about the trade-offs involved in alternative regulatory structures. Specifically, they examine the relative merits of consolidating regulation in a single agency or dispersing it among multiple agencies. They also describe various institutional devices that mitigate against the disadvantages associated with each structure of regulation. The paper should be of great help to policy makers as they consider changes to the existing structure of financial regulation. Notwithstanding my favorable view of the paper, I do have a few suggestions.
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