Abstract

The role of cooperative game theory within economic theory seems to be smaller than the impact of other areas within game theory, at least up to now. Obviously, one reason for this is the simple fact that there is a larger worldwide tradition of doing research in a noncooperative setting. Moreover, it seems to be easier to provide a detailed description of a noncooperative model by specifying formally the strategic possibilities of all agents involved, whereas the concept of ‘cooperation’ is harder to control. Cooperative models usually focus on (variants of) the rather simple model of TU games, where the cooperation possibilities of a coalition are summarized in one single (monetary) value.

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