Comments on Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism

Abstract

Comments on Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism Annemarie Butler (bio) Donald C. Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism (hereafter "HTS") is a wonderful book—clearly written and forcefully argued—and was deservedly honored with Journal of the History of Philosophy's Book Prize for 2016. The focus of the book is part four of the first Book of Hume's Treatise, "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy." Ainslie develops an interpretation that takes seriously Hume's psychological claims, using them to solve puzzles in Hume scholarship, including the extent of Hume's scepticism, the nature of his sceptical crisis, and the basis for his second thoughts on personal identity. I would encourage Ainslie to go further in tracing Hume's psychological explanations. In what follows, I will discuss three areas: the role of language in the formation of the "vulgar" (or non-philosophical) belief in body; Hume's analysis of continued existence; and the nature of secondary ideas. 1. The Role of Language in the Vulgar Belief Hume explicitly credits the "great philosopher" Berkeley (T 1.1.7.1n4; SBN 17n1) for his rejection of abstract general ideas and his theory of general ideas. "[A]ll general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex'd to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them" (T 1.1.7.1; SBN 17).1 Ainslie describes Hume's account of general ideas as "a model for the later fictions Hume develops" (HTS 67), particularly noting the use of a word or term to facilitate thought. Ainslie reconstructs Hume's explanation of the "vulgar" belief in objects in Treatise 1.4.2. The "vulgar" includes anyone who is not engaged in philosophical reflection (T 1.4.2.38, 53; [End Page 101] SBN 206, 216), including non-human animals. (Hume describes animal causal inferences about objects in Treatise 1.3.16.) According to Hume, the "vulgar" do not distinguish between objects and perceptions; we think the hat or stone is the very thing we sense (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202). Ainslie holds that there is a "linguistic element" that scholars overlook in Hume's account of the vulgar belief in objects. According to Ainslie, language serves a normative role, distinguishing between good and bad judgments about whether something is the same object or not. Ainslie offers a developmental story (HTS 94–97), in which one develops beliefs in object-identity and linguistic skills together. The associations that a child or adult makes are modified in response to linguistic prompts from other people in his or her social group. Not only would it take more argument to establish that language can perform the task Ainslie thinks Hume assigns to it, the interpretation is textually underdetermined. As Ainslie admits, there is not much evidence in Treatise 1.4.2 to support this interpretation (HTS 92, 96–97); instead, he points to Treatise 1.4.3 ("Of the antient philosophy") and Treatise 1.4.6 ("Of personal identity"). In Treatise 1.4.2, I would argue, Hume is more interested in the fundamental questions of how we can conceive and believe in continued and distinct existence at all. That is, given the starting point of impressions and ideas, how can I conceive (and believe) that one and the same object that I believe to exist now also existed and operated at earlier times when I did not observe it? On my interpretation, this automatic, vulgar belief in objects is common both to humans and non-human animals, and is therefore pre-linguistic. 2. Continued Existence In Treatise 1.4.2, Hume aims to explain the causes of belief in body (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187); to this end, he searches for the experiential origins of the idea of externality. He distinguishes two features of external existence: continued existence and distinct existence (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188). According to Hume, continued existence involves belief that the same objects exist "even when they are not present to the senses" (ibid.). Distinct existence includes existence and operation independent of the perceiving mind. Hume adds, "Under...