Commentary on ‘The Worm and the Juggernaught’

Abstract

J. R. Lucas proposes sensible reforms of the present English Inquiry system to approve highway routes. However, his critique may not be radical enough, for it accepts a basic assumption of the system and little affects the funda mental role of professional planners. Professor Lucas criticizes three matters: silly mistakes, the substantive standard for decisions, and procedures. I do not discuss silly mistakes, such as placing no value on the life of a retiree, but focus on the substantive stan dard and procedures. Both of these matters importantly depend on the nature of the decisions to be made. Planning decisions, especially those to construct and locate public projects such as roads, power plants, and airports, allocate benefits and burdens among people. Usually many persons benefit and a few lose. Although some people might benefit a lot, for example, developers with land adjacent to roads, most people benefit only a small amount from increased access, de creased traffic congestion, and so on. However, a few lose. Although these persons often share in the general benefits, their burdens are significantly greater than their benefits. Thus, planning decisions typically impose burdens on a few for the benefit of the many and so raise moral issues of justice. Various moral approaches and criteria exist for imposing burdens on a few for the benefit of many. The utilitarian approach is to choose so as to obtain the greatest net benefit. This criterion fits closely with benefit/cost analysis. Another approach deems such decisions unjust, at least if made without the consent of the burdened few, because they are treated as means to the ends of others. Lucas rejects the former approach, but in light of the not-in-my backyard syndrome, he does not advocate the second either. Instead, he suggests two criteria for a just decision. These two criteria pertain to two aspects of the problem?should the project proceed? and if so, where? First,