Abstract
Commentary: "Neural signatures of intransitive preferences".
Highlights
Kalenscher et al (2010) explored the neural signatures of intransitive preferences. This endeavor is of great interest because transitivity of preferences has long been considered a key feature of rationality
Index) that we argue is not grounded in a quantitative model of choice behavior
Economists and psychologists have studied the conceptual challenges of taking a deterministic axiom like transitivity and expanding it into a probability model to incorporate the inherent uncertainty in human behavior (Luce, 1959; Block and Marschak, 1960; Luce and Narens, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1995; Hey, 2005)
Summary
Kalenscher et al (2010) explored the neural signatures of intransitive preferences. This endeavor is of great interest because transitivity of preferences has long been considered a key feature of rationality. These two models of transitive preferences embody two different ways to capture uncertainty/variability of behavior formally. According to the random preference model, preferences are probabilistic, while responses are deterministic (error-free). According to weak stochastic transitivity, preferences are deterministic and responses are probabilistic (noisy).
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