Commentary: Alliances and Dis-alliances between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean

Abstract

I have always been struck by the fact that, as far as U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is concerned, every time a new president arrives at the White House it is as if history began anew. What happened before is alien to him, as if instead of assuming responsibility for a state, he represented himself in the way of absolute monarchs. The president never has to explain previous policies, whether the support of military dictatorships or interven tions in civil wars, the imposition of immigration measures, trade or environ mental practices, covert or financial actions against governments, humanitarian, antidrug, or military-aid missions, weapons sales, psychological warfare, or unilateral military-diplomatic decisions. He never feels compelled to coordi nate his actions with those he calls America's allies in this hemisphere, among them actions that involve U.S. alliances with Europe, Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and so on, even though these affect our hemisphere. It is as if, every four (or eight) years, the United States disappeared and another country took its place, a country led by someone whose main concerns, even after taking a tour of the region, are elsewhere. For Latin Americans the experience is quite different. They cannot help remembering the losses, damages, costs, and aftertastes of the things that have taken place over the past 50 years. At the same time, they do not expect much from the United States. (Or perhaps some of them do: the Chileans, considered among the United States' closest partners in the region, for example, were actually expecting that, during his recent visit to Santiago, President Obama would apologize for the U.S.-backed overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973 and for U.S. support for the dictatorship of 1973—1990.) Although he cele brated as exemplary the Brazilian transition from dictatorship to democracy, Brazilians might have been surprised if the president had recognized the U.S. support for the military junta of 1964-1985 and Salvadorans if he had apolo gized for the prolonging of the atrocious war of 1980-1992. Although it is dif ficult to make a fresh start, some governments have tried to bury these memories and, with them, their illusions regarding the United States. They welcome the president and talk about partnerships, but they scarcely believe in specific agreements. Most countries do not count on U.S. support in dealing with their internal problems, nor do they look to the North to find a way to international development. They are establishing (or attempting to establish) more trade agreements with China than with the United States and relying