Abstract
Consider our surprise to suddenly find out that, as researchers in the field of comparative cognition, we are in fact not comparative psychologists. We admit to not having consistently referred to ourselves specifically as comparative psychologists, so perhaps we have not lost a definitive component of our identities, but in turn it feels like waking up one day to find one's pinky fingers have been surreptitiously removed and to spend the rest of the day continually realizing that they had in fact previously been there all along.
Highlights
Specialty section: This article was submitted to Comparative Psychology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
We admit to not having consistently referred to ourselves as comparative psychologists, so perhaps we have not lost a definitive component of our identities, but in turn it feels like waking up one day to find one’s pinky fingers have been surreptitiously removed and to spend the rest of the day continually realizing that they had previously been there all along
Abramson gives little indication of what does and does not constitute comparative psychology, except to present his belief that it cannot be wholly subsumed by integrative biology, evolutionary psychology, or comparative cognition
Summary
Consider our surprise to suddenly find out that, as researchers in the field of comparative cognition, we are not comparative psychologists. Abramson gives little indication of what does and does not constitute comparative psychology, except to present his belief that it cannot be wholly subsumed by integrative biology, evolutionary psychology, or comparative cognition.
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