Comment on Gray

Abstract

28 Historically Speaking January/February 2006 Emphasis in the original. 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 606. Emphasis in the original. 7 My exchange with Antulio J. Echevarría on "Clausewitz and 'How Has War Changed?'" can be found in Parameters 35 (Summer 2005): 138140 . 8 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, "Conclusion: The Future Behind Us," in Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics ofMilitary Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175ff. 9 Napoleon, quoted in Echevarría, "The Trouble with History," 81, albeit with a prudent "reportedly " added. 10Clausewitz, On War, 104. 11Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 68, rev. ed. (National Defense University, 2004), is outstanding. 12 1 am hardly in a position to criticize this phenomenon , given that I have added to it with Another Bloody Century. For some examples, see: Mark Cerasini, The Future of War: The Face of Ust-Century Warfare (Alpha, 2003); Christopher Coker, The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the 21st Century (Blackwell, 2004); Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature ofWar (Frank Cass, 2005); and Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Polity, 2005). 13Clausewitz, On War, 566. 14Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to "The Peloponnesian War", trans. Richard Crawley, rev. ed. (Free Press, 1996), 43. 15Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War," in Clausewitz, On War, 54. Comment on Gray Peter Paret There is much that I agree with in Colin Gray's statement on the future ofwarfare , and much that puzzles me in his exuberant declaration of independence from constraints that too often afflict historians. On a major point we see eye to eye. Technological development will always create new ways of fighting, but it has not changed the non-military and military elements of intent and violence that together make up war. To the people who do the fighting , technological innovation necessarily looms large, and it is understandable if it colors their thoughts about every aspect of war. But a new level of destructiveness or more rapid and secure delivery systems cannot override such matters as the relationship between political goals, military aims, and the efforts to achieve them. Any attempt to predict how wars will be fought in the future must take account of this relationship, as well as of further technological development. It is easier to recommend ways in which the relationship may be strengthened, than to predict how—or even that—it will be changed. Since the 1960s, this country has confronted opponents whose ideas on war and how to wage war have not always matched our expectations . Too often our political and military leaders have assumed that the other side would react as we might, a psychological and intellectual error difficult to avoid, perhaps especially so for a society with worldwide Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pointing to a map of Vietnam at a press conference, April 1965. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division [reproduction number, LC-USZ62-134155]. interests and commitments that nevertheless remains somewhat insular. Recent administrations have not always adopted realistic aims nor developed appropriate methods to achieve them. And neither in the 1960s nor today have they been good at explaining to the American public the broad lines ofpolitical and military policy in reasonably factual terms. But substantial public support may do more to win a war than a new weapons system. Perhaps not too much should be made of these deficiencies . In war the enemy is often misunderstood and yet may be defeated, and even a malfunctioning political and military leadership may succeed—though presumably success would come at unnecessarily high cost. But with whatever means future wars will be fought, the familiar interaction of violence and politics between opponents (intensified by the interaction in each belligerent of domestic and external politics with the use of, and exposure to, violence) will again play itself out, whatever the technology employed. With Gray I believe that Clausewitz helps us to think about war conceptually and comparatively. Clausewitz moves beyond the description and analysis ofthe wars of his time to identify elements common to all...