Comment: Of Money and Momentum

Abstract

A little more than two decades ago, the rules and institutions governing American presidential nominations were decisively reshaped by two major reform movements. The first occurred primarily between 1969 and 1972, when the Democratic party completely rewrote its rules concerning the selection of national convention delegates, which in turn compelled substantial changes in state primary laws and caucusing procedures. The second took place in 1974, when the U.S. Congress instituted sweeping changes in the federal campaign finance laws. For reasons that have never been clear to me, analysis and commentary about the new dynamics of presidential selection-from both academics and journalists-have focused overwhelmingly on the first of these developments, while largely ignoring the second. While a small river of ink has been expended on the alleged effects of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines, there is surprisingly little systematic work on whether and how the new campaign finance laws have altered the tenor of presidential nominating politics. For example, probably the best-known academic account of the contemporary nomination process is that developed by Larry M. Bartels in his award-winning book, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (1988). Bartels mentions the subject of campaign finance on exactly three pages, and then only in passing. His model provides important roles for press coverage, public opinion, previous primary results, and enduring political predispositions, but essentially ignores the role of money (The same can be said of many other leading works on this topic, including Keeter and Zukin 1983; Brady and Johnston 1987; and Geer 1989.) Against this background, Katherine A. Hinckley and John C. Green's article Fund-raising in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: The Primary Lessons of 1988 represents, I believe, a significant contribution to the literature. Hinckley and Green do take money seriously-and in so doing, provide a very useful way of organizing and conceptualizing some of the major questions about its role in presidential politics. Indeed, I would go further than this and say that, by the end of their article, they convince me that they are about half right. Organization, in their sense of the term, does seem to be one important factor explaining the flow of presidential campaign funds. What I wish to defend is the proposition that the campaign also matters: that fund-raising also has much to do with the relative performance of the competing candidates. My argument proceeds in three stages. In the first, I raise a number of questions about Hinckley and Green's interpretation of the fund-raising model and the predictions that may reasonably be derived from it. Next, I offer a few criticisms of the variable the authors use as a measure of organizational influences on fund-raising. Finally, I provide a brief sketchgiven space limitations, it can be no more than that-of some of the most important ways that campaign performance and fund-raising success do seem to be interrelated. THE CAMPAIGN-DRIVEN MODEL REEXAMINED Hinckley and Green, it should be said at the outset, have taken on a very difficult challenge in this article: they are attempting to test and refute a model that, as they correctly note, has never been particularly well-developed. If good academic work often profits from the existence of a strong and wellformulated counterargument, the target that Hinckley and Green are aiming at is a regrettably blurry one. Conceding the inherent difficulty of their task, however, I nevertheless feel that the authors have significantly misunderstood and/or mischaracterized the body of arguments and insights that tie fundraising success to campaign performance. Indeed, I would contest almost every one of the hypotheses they list as being a clear or necessary implication of a campaign-driven model. Specifically: 1. A significant number of candidates raise the bulk of their funds during the period of the primary campaign. …