Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence

Abstract

For operational intelligence, as for most else that governs the course of war, the battle is the pay-off. During the Second World War, major encounters between Germany and its Western foes were, in almost all instances, profoundly affected by effective utilization, misreading or neglect of intelligence. Recent years have shed new light on what this meant for the fortunes of the belligerents. The revelations of Gustave Bertrand (1973) and F. W. Winterbotham (1974) concerning the Ultra secret led to the release of archival records on a scale that has a precedent only during the great 'war guilt' debate of the 1920s. The new insights this assures have reached far beyond the already wide range of information reached by Ultra itself. Once so central and previously undreamed source of information had been laid bare, there seemed small purpose in maintaining the more severe restrictions on intelligence data gathered by other means. Except for Secret Service files and what is held back for specific reasons, the doors have been flung open rather widely.