Comium, Too Big to Fail? A Brief Overview of Corporate Rescue in Sierra Leone

Abstract

In a widely circulated press release, the National Telecommunications Commission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter referred to as “Natcom”) suspended the operating license of Comium (SL) Limited, one of the four leading GSM operators in Sierra Leone. This suspension was effective from the 13th October, 2014. The release made public and official the woes the company has faced for the most part of 2013 to 2014. At its prime, Comium epitomized a strong player in a growing market that led in the provision of GSM internet services to its mostly youthful as well as corporate clientele. From the public point of view, the downturn of the fate of Comium is as dramatic and sensational as its entry into the market: that is, its provision of over six (6) months of free intra-network calls, is rivaled only by the sensations of the “grab law” collection spectacle employed by its creditors, who resorted to the closing down of the company’s corporate head office on countless occasions. With the suspension of its license by Natcom, (a regulatory unsecured creditor), one is left to opine that Comium has been let loose to be devoured by its creditors with no rescue or reorganization mechanism either in sight or foreshadowed.This article takes a cursory glance at the debt problems of Comium, and provides an overview of the possible legal tools for either a business rescue, or other alternatives for creditors’ satisfaction in Sierra Leone. The aim is to bring to the fore, the need for legal solutions for corporate rescue of companies whose indebtedness endangers a low-base emerging economy, with its attendant economic, political and social consequences; including but not limited to unemployment, revenue generation, and social upheavals. In exploring the business rescue options, this paper will take a comparative look into the paradigmatic bankruptcy law in the United States of America; and the insolvency law in England given its historical jurisprudential links to Sierra Leone. This paper also seeks to ignite a healthy debate with respect to the preference of either bailout or insolvency led reorganization for private companies considered to be ‘too big to fail.’