Abstract
Recently, passive information leakage and active fault injection are widely utilized to conduct attacks and these attacks have become a serious threat to most cryptosystems such as RSA. In order to ensure the security, many exponentiation algorithms with resistance to different side-channel attacks were developed. In 2007, Amiel et al. Firstly combined Fault Attack (FA) and Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack, which are considered as the classical active and passive attacks respectively, to recover the private key of some RSA implementations. In this paper, we show that Boscher's blind fault resistant exponentiation algorithm is also vulnerable to this kind of attack. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure exponentiation algorithm to resist the combined attack as well as SPA, DPA and DFA.
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