Abstract
This paper examines British combined arms tactics in the last three months of 1918, via a case study of Third Army. It argues that, although some formations were capable of using sophisticated combined arms tactics well, others were not, and the application of such methods remained more diverse than some recent research has suggested. The diversity of approach was rooted not only in objective external factors, but also in the fact that pre-war regular officers continued to dominate the army of 1918. Their culture, rooted in the attitudes of the nineteenth century or even earlier, militated against the coherent dissemination and application of a single doctrine.
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