Abstract

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

Highlights

  • Tammany Hall was the Democratic Party-political machine dominating New York City’s politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century

  • By exploring how institutional corruption among elected officials can be combatted, this article argues for the need to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach – an approach exploring how each individual policy affects mechanisms outlined in either framework

  • The remaining part of this article will explore whether the policy suggestion to enforce the appearance standard through an independent public commission could, if properly designed, address mechanisms raised in both the principal-agent and collective action frameworks

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Summary

Introduction

Tammany Hall was the Democratic Party-political machine dominating New York City’s politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. By exploring how institutional corruption among elected officials can be combatted, this article argues for the need to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach – an approach exploring how each individual policy affects mechanisms outlined in either framework. Having outlined a complementary perspective, the article discusses how principal-agent and collective action frameworks respectively can address systemic corruption seen in its institutional form. The article concludes on the humble note that its contributions lie as much in its attempt to introduce a way of describing systemic corruption in its institutional form as to combat it, calling for empirically guided research of anti-corruption policies

Defining systemic corruption
Findings
Conclusion
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