Abstract

The onslaught on the World’s wildlife continues despite numerous initiatives aimed at curbing it. We build a model that integrates rhino horn trade with rhino population dynamics in order to evaluate the impact of various management policies on rhino sustainability. In our model, an agent-based sub-model of horn trade from the poaching event up through a purchase of rhino horn in Asia impacts rhino abundance. A data-validated, individual-based sub-model of the rhino population of South Africa provides these abundance values. We evaluate policies that consist of different combinations of legal trade initiatives, demand reduction marketing campaigns, increased anti-poaching measures within protected areas, and transnational policing initiatives aimed at disrupting those criminal syndicates engaged in horn trafficking. Simulation runs of our model over the next 35 years produces a sustainable rhino population under only one management policy. This policy includes both a transnational policing effort aimed at dismantling those criminal networks engaged in rhino horn trafficking—coupled with increases in legal economic opportunities for people living next to protected areas where rhinos live. This multi-faceted approach should be the focus of the international debate on strategies to combat the current slaughter of rhino rather than the binary debate about whether rhino horn trade should be legalized. This approach to the evaluation of wildlife management policies may be useful to apply to other species threatened by wildlife trafficking.

Highlights

  • Unprecedented wildlife trafficking threatens biodiversity [1]

  • We present for the year 2014, prices paid in U.S dollars after converting the raw South African Rand values following [28]

  • There are several levels of middlemen involved in the illegal rhino horn trade (SANParks, Ken Maggs, ken.maggs@sanparks.org). We model these as one meta-firm, i.e., we model the middlemen that directly purchase rhino horns from poachers up through the exporters as working for a single firm: the illegal trader

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Summary

Introduction

Unprecedented wildlife trafficking threatens biodiversity [1]. Asians consume charismatic mammal products often obtained from non-Asian sources [2]. There is some evidence that demand for rhino horn among Asian consumers is inelastic [3]. This means that the quantity of rhino horn demanded by consumers does not change when the price of such horn changes [4]. Inelastic demand contributes to a perception of high profit potential [5] in rhino poaching, by organized crime syndicates. Often such syndicates recruit individuals living in communities adjacent to natural parks and private game reserves, especially if these protected areas have populations of rhinos. Attractiveness of illegal activities rises when communities have historically traded in or used wildlife products, but wrestle with unclear rights over wildlife

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