Combating a Combat Legacy

Abstract

The combat-centric legacy of the US Army is stable and durable. It during World War II and has persisted relatively intact throughout the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and even in the post-9/11 era. The legacy endures not only in organizational form, doctrine, and equipment but also in training, education, and culture. Its persistence impedes the ability to conduct either sequential full-spectrum operations (occurring in traditional multiphase operations) or simultaneous full-spectrum operations (occurring in complex insurgencies such as those manifesting in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)). And it dramatically limits the US Army's capacity to adapt to other noncombat or untraditional roles and missions. The stability of the legacy, despite the experiences of OIF, typifies the inertial qualities of the institutional US Army, which has, as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster describes, developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare. (1) Furthermore, the legacy signifies a rejection of the hard-fought organizational adaptations realized in Iraq that made the force more full-spectrum capable than perhaps it had ever been. The Army's combat legacy required substantial organizational adaptation throughout OIF principally combat skills did not translate into full-spectrum capabilities. The Army's combat orientation retarded the force's ability to adapt structurally and cognitively so as to modify organizational inputs (training, equipment, intelligence production, etc.) and outputs (task performance competency, behavior, etc.) to achieve organizational goals and objectives in pursuit of national interests. Significant and substantial modification was required to transform an institution with a combat legacy into one capable of conducting simultaneous full-spectrum operations in support of strategy. The duration and degree of adaptation in OIF are relevant if imprecise measurements of how unsuitable the post-9/11 force was for translating tactical and operational action and success into strategic and political victory. Whether the adaptive and truly full-spectrum capable force created under fire during OIF will be retained in the future is unclear, but early indications suggest that a return to the legacy through modernization and rebalancing is not only likely but preferred despite strategic requirements. Instead of focusing on rebalancing, modernization, and a return to a combat-centric, legacy force, the Army should instead incorporate lessons from OIF to create a truly full-spectrum proficient force capable of supporting national interests and strategic requirements. Full-spectrum Capabilities, Balance, and Modernization The definition of the term full-spectrum is difficult to discern given the differing qualities that are attributed to this capability. In one sense, being full-spectrum capable refers to the capacity for fighting future combat-centric wars. In the 2008 Army Posture Statement, then-Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff George Casey wrote, To reset our force [because of the imbalance caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan] we must prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies ... [and] retrain our soldiers to accomplish the full spectrum of missions they will be expected to accomplish. (2) In another sense, being full-spectrum capable means maintaining the capacity to fight a range of threats in a multitude of environments. Major Mark Calhoun contends that because a return to the Army's tradition of 'small wars' appears to be the primary characteristic of current and future operations, a transformation process that relies on long-range destruction of targets seems anything but 'full-spectrum.' (3) Although there is no published definition for full-spectrum capability, a definition exists for full-spectrum dominance that decidedly suggests (despite experience) that combat capability neatly and fluidly translates into full-spectrum capability. …