Abstract
The property which perceptual experiences of a given phenomenal kind enable the subject to track is not always identical with the property objects appear to have (in a phenomenally manifest manner) in the kind of experience at issue. Tracked properties and apparent properties come apart in colour perception but they are identical in the perception of three-dimensional shape. In order to defend these claims, this chapter proposes a criterion for the identity of tracked property and apparent property in a given experience. The view developed leads to an account of the traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In order to capture what it is to instantiate a given secondary quality, one must specify the phenomenal kind of perceptual experience an instantiation of the property would render veridical.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
