Abstract

Colombia's main drug trafficking coalitions—the Medellín and Cali syndicates—constitute powerful illegitimate interest groups. Traffickers, especially the Medellín coalition, exert political influence partly through violence and intimidation. Yet, the drug lords' political arsenal also includes non-coercive tools—bribery, investments, contributions to political campaigns, and even open lobbying in the media. Conventional law enforcement strategies have been ineffective against the cocaine mafia, which is well entrenched in Colombian society. Wide domestic opposition to the drug war has prompted Colombia to opt for an unconventional strategy: negotiating the voluntary withdrawal of major traffickers from the cocaine trade. This approach has yielded a reduction in drug-related violence in Colombia, but has had little impact on the cocaine industry per se. Progress in the war against cocaine in Colombia will require strengthening the criminal justice system, introducing tougher antidrug statutes and applying U.S. principles of plea bargaining in dealing with the cocaine mafia.

Full Text
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