Colombian Sovereignty Under Siege

Abstract

Conclusions: * Absent political and military reforms, Colombia risks either becoming a narcostate or disintegrating. * Popular discontent with government policies indicates Colombia is ripe for a dirty war. * The FARC and ELN will continue their involvement in the drug business to increase their wealth. * Insurgent activity will increase, especially in areas where government control is limited. * The potential loss of democracy in Colombia threatens regional stability. Colombia Nears Critical Juncture Since 1966, Colombia's internal security has been disrupted by the actions of two guerrilla forces, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberaci(n Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN). Recent attacks against the military, economy, and civilian populace are creating havoc for Colombian leaders and citizens; combat operations have averaged two encounters daily for a year. Although the guerrillas lack the military strength to topple the government, their destructiveness has the potential to destabilize Colombia's political institutions. Colombia could, in fact, collapse as a nation. Government institutions are weak, especially in the areas occupied by the guerrillas and drug cartels. Breakdown is already occurring in several areas where government presence is negligible. Anarchy could set in if reforms to strengthen national institutions are not implemented soon, and the government might begin a dirty war to preempt the disintegration of Colombia. The FARC, the largest and most powerful of Colombia's guerrilla organizations (7,700 troops), is well-armed and financed following years of kidnapping, extortion, tax collection, and involvement in the illegal drug trade. The ELN, though smaller (2,500 troops), is almost as wealthy and causes as much damage. With the collapse of Soviet and Cuban financial support, insurgent operations have been partially funded by the cocaine and heroin business, estimated to supply half of the guerrillas' annual $.5 to 1.5 billion income. Only a small portion of this income is used to purchase weapons and other military equipment to maintain operational and combat activities (estimated at $20 million per year). The balance is invested in land, transportation businesses, and a well-managed portfolio. This bolsters the armed forces' argument that the insurgents in Colombia are in the business for the money, not the ideology. Estimates of the insurgent's damage to Colombia's economy range as high as $1.5 billion per year (4% of the 1994 GDP). This includes the cost of damage caused by violence, direct defense (up to 3.27% of GDP), lost business, and human life [see Figure 1]. The Insurgents Doctrine and Ideology. The FARC had its origins in the civil war--between the Liberals and Conservatives--that erupted into the episode known as La Violencia (1948-1965). Officially established in 1966, the FARC was the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party, and still pushes a Marxist-Leninist platform of a massive redistribution of land and wealth, state control of natural resources, increased government spending on social welfare (to 50% of government expenditures), and a non-military solution (probably legalization) to the illegal drug problem. The FARC attacks the entire business sector. The more recently organized ELN follows a similar agenda, though it primarily targets the oil industry, pressuring for nationalization. The FARC has doubled its membership since 1986, and operates in over 70% of the country. ELN troop strength has remained static for several years. Leadership. Recent insurgent leadership changes have increasingly decentralized the high command's power. Front leaders now achieve influence through money, rather than ideology or combat experience, thus explaining their willingness to get involved in the drug business. …