Abstract
Abstract We address the collusion problem in a reputation-driven multi-agent system where agents represent service providers, consumers, and a controller. A game structure is proposed where players are supposed rational and payoff maximizers. The main issue addressed in this paper is how to maintain a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. We analyze the behavior of different players with respect to the strategies adopted by the opponents. We provide theoretical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant strategies.
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