Abstract
We study a vote buying setup where a committee votes on a proposal important to the vote buyer. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal's passing in different voting environments. We find that for both simultaneous and sequential votes, the vote buyer publicly offers small bribes to a large super-majority of members. Each member accepts because he anticipates that the proposal will pass regardless of his vote. We discuss the committee design that maximizes cost of capture: demanding majority requirements combined with diversity among members make the committee more expensive. In small committees, sequential voting increases cost while the opposite is true for large committees. On the other hand, additional members and transparent voting rules lower the cost.
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