Collusion, Obstruction of Justice and Impeachment

Abstract

The notion of impeaching a sitting United States President is envisioned in the very first iteration of the United States Constitution in Article II, Section 4, which provides: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” In the context of President Donald Trump’s alleged wrongful acts, there has yet to be such prolonged and seemingly endless public discussion from pundits, politicians, news outlets, scholars, and even the President himself on what acts rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Specifically, there are a host of acts, many of which will be discussed further herein, that are the subject of debate concerning whether they rise to the level of obstruction of justice and accordingly may provide the basis for a finding of a high crime or misdemeanor under Article II of the US Constitution. As alluded to above, Trump’s purported wrongful acts range from his efforts to persuade FBI Director James Comey to end an investigation of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn. They also include the President’s purported involvement in a meeting with foreign nationals who claimed had negative information on the President’s campaign opponent. According to most legal experts, the thrust of the potential legal wrongs with respect to these and other related instances is whether the President, among other things, violated the federal obstruction of justice statutes. Most recently, the President, his counsel, and others have attempted to morph the question of obstruction of justice, to a question of whether the president “colluded” with Russians and/or the Russian government.