Abstract
This paper studies a class of repeated games played between two identical firms. Each firm consists of overlapping generations of short-lived members. The stage game is either price or quantity competition in a homogeneous good market. We consider whether short-lived members' strategies exist that implement the firm's grim-trigger strategy. We show that if each firm consists of more than two generations, the strategy is implementable with a type of seniority system under both price and quantity competition; if the firm consists of only two generations, the strategy under price competition is implementable, while that under quantity competition is not.
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