Abstract
Between Physics and de Caelo , Aristotle seems to define objects examined by the science of differently. This chapter starts with natural things in Physics II and then turns to body in de Caelo I to specify problems at stake in Aristotle's analysis of science of nature and to consider difficulties across these texts. The solution to these difficulties, author argues, may be inferred from Aristotle's account of substance in Metaphysics . The chapter concludes that Aristotle's account of substance as form, matter, and combination of form and matter in fact resolves these difficulties and tells us why science of nature must be both of natural things and of bodies. Physics II and de Caelo I are neither inconsistent nor do they require a thesis of development from one position to another. Keywords: de Caelo I; natural things; Physics II; science of nature
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