Abstract
ABSTRACT Collective reputation plays an extremely important role in many industries including tourism cities. With game theory approaches, based on Lijiang City in China, this article captures the collective reputation of tourism cities to deter low-quality products. On the one hand, low-quality firms have crowding effects on outputs and profits of high-quality firms in tourism cities. These effects are amplified in the long run. On the other hand, entry regulation, monitoring quality and labelling quality are suggested to deter low-quality firms to destroy the reputation of tourism cities. The policy implication is to deter low-quality firms to maintain the collective reputation of tourism cities.
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