Abstract
This paper presents a critique and an extension of Weissberg's theory of collective representation. The present paper redefines collective representation as the extent to which policy outputs reflect nation-wide public preferences. Data on public preferences collected by the SRC/CPS election surveys in 1978 are supplemented with roll-call data from the 95th Congress to demonstrate that assessments of the extent of collective representation vary considerably depending on the conceptual defiition of representation. If one uses Weissberg's definition of representation as having one's point of view articulated in the legislature, collective representation looks much better than dyadic. When defined as collective satisfaction with the outcome, however, collective representation enjoys the advantage over dyadic on only two House votes out of seven.
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