Abstract
Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.
Highlights
Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation
Instead, we find that collective punishment can result in the emergence of a stable state of full cooperation (x = 1 ) (Fig. 3(d,e)), while such a harmonious ALLC state does not emerge when the collective reward mechanism is carried out (Fig. 3(b,c))
To explore how cooperative systems evolve in the absence of cognition, we have proposed a collective punishment mechanism, and incorporate it into the multiplayer snowdrift game
Summary
Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. N-player evolutionary snowdrift game with collective punishment in a single species (intra-specific cooperation). N-player evolutionary snowdrift game with collective punishment or reward between two species (mutualistic cooperation).
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
