Collective Labour Rights for Working People

This paper aims to analyse collective labour rights of both “classic” selfemployed persons and economically dependent self-employed workers under the Spanish Statute of Self-Employed Workers (Ley 20/2007 del Estatuto del Trabajo Autónomo). The author applies comparative analysis and critical reasoning with a view to answering the questions: is the scope of protection wide enough, and can Poland draw a lesson from it? The paper presents evidence that demonstrates that among all self-employed workers, only economically dependent self-employed workers are granted the right to bargain collectively. However, findings suggest that in practice, collective bargaining is stymied mainly because it takes place only at the enterprise level, and because the number of economically dependent self-employed workers is minimal. The paper concludes that collective labour rights under the Statute of Self-Employed Workers could be better protected (especially as regards “classic” self-employed persons). On the other hand, however, in Poland, the lack of any criteria that would enable a diversification of the scope of collective rights granted to self-employed persons is subject to criticism. It appears that in some areas the legislator should differentiate the scope of protection. The criterion of economic dependence, which exists in Spanish law, could be successfully used for this purpose.

ABSTRACTBased on the 2015 China Employer-Employee Survey data, this article presents descriptive statistics on collective and individual labor rights in Chinese manufacturing firms. The former includes data about rights pertaining to labor unions and collective bargaining, while the latter includes promotion and remuneration. The main findings are as follows. (1) Although the indicators vary widely in terms of firm-specific characteristics (e.g. size, capital sources, ownership structure, exporting, and industry), the overall protection level of collective labor rights in Chinese manufacturing firms appear to meet accepted levels with 61.45% of firms offering labor unions and 64.93% engaging in collective wage bargaining. (2) While a few employees did not enjoy individual labor rights such as promotions and social security (e.g. 40% workers had no opportunity for promotion), discrimination based on demographical characters (e.g. gender, Hukou, and education level) is not evident for employees’ individual labor rights.Abbreviations: CEES: China Employer-Employee Survey; ILO: International Labor Organization.

Collective labour rights, including the right to organize and strike, were recognized in the principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as fundamental rights. Despite their importance, different countries enacted legislation that included a ban on police organization in trade unions or a ban just on police strikes. The right of police officers to organize and strike is of particular importance nowadays at a time of increased public scrutiny and large-scale protests over incidents of extra-judicial killing by police. There is a need to recognize collective rights for police officers in order to improve working conditions and organizational justice at work for them as a way of moderating officers’ perspectives of public hostility and improving their capability to carry out their duties. Another benefit of recognizing a right to organize is the union’s capacity to advance important values, including avoiding racism and violence and assuring the compliance of individual officers with the ethics and code of conduct expected from police officers. This article seeks to address the unique topic of the linkage between the collective labour rights of police officers and varieties of constitutionalism in these critical times. It introduces two potential approaches in this regard: (1) global labour constitutionalism; and (2) militaristic labour constitutionalism. The former implements international standards set by the ILO as a basis for constitutionalism while the latter emphasizes domestic issues and the need to maintain the public order and security of citizens. The article examines the possibility of applying global labour constitutionalism as a basis for recognizing collective rights for police officers.

After Turkey's political system was transformed to a multi-party democracy, legally interpreted collective labour rights were introduced to the system by legal instruments. The first Trade Unions Act was enacted in 1947. Depending on the articles related to collective labour rights, stated in 1961 Constitution, the Turkish National Assembly passed two particular legislation in 1963, numbered 274 and 275. These codes governed labour unions and collective bargaining, as well as grievance procedures such as strikes and lockouts. The 1982 Turkish Constitution established collective bargaining and strike action as fundamental rights as well as the prior Constitution. For nearly three decades, collective labour rights have regulated by two different legislation, numbered 2821 and 2822. In 2012, new legislation was proposed to regulate collective labour relations and meet the necessities of the social parties. The Law of Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements (law numbered 6356) is the current principal legislative tool for dealing with trade unions and collective labour agreements, as well as strike and lock-out. In Turkish system, the formation of trade unions and employers' associations is based on a voluntary and free basis and requires no previous approval from administrative bodies. Employers' organizations and trade unions both have legal personality. A double threshold approach for trade unions to conduct collective bargaining has been criticized by the ILO on several occasions. Strikes are infrequently utilized as an industrial action, despite the fact that they are protected by the Constitution and the Law numbered 6356.

The importance of the issues covered in this article is due to the impact of information technologies on the labour sphere, transformation of the features of “classical” labour relations and the need to rethink the categories of “employee” and “employer” in order to ensure the exercise of collective labour rights, such as the right to association, collective bargaining and collective action by all workers regardless of the form of employment, first of all, by dependent self-employed persons. The author emphasises that the ILO, the CJEU in the opinions of their supervisory bodies, and the EU Court of Justice in their judgments use a broad approach to the interpretation of the concept of employee, including self-employed persons, in particular, in the context of exercising the right to association and collective bargaining. The author presents the experience of certain European countries, in particular, France and Poland, in terms of legislative consolidation of fundamental labour rights for self-employed persons. The article demonstrates that courts in different jurisdictions have different approaches to resolving the issue of the legal status of platform workers using the example of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Spanish court in the Deliveroo case. It is stated that in Ukraine today, one of the fundamental labour rights - the right to join a trade union de jure is not limited by the existence of an employment relationship or the status of an employee. At the same time, the right to collective bargaining, collective bargaining agreements and the right to collective action to protect one’s rights, which are an integral part of the right to freedom of association, is de facto only possible for those who are in an employment relationship based on an employment contract and have the status of an employee. As a solution to this problem, it is proposed to introduce a broad category of “working” or “employed” in national legislation, which will be used exclusively for the purposes of unionisation, exercise of the right to collective bargaining, conclusion of collective agreements and collective action. Such a definition should be separated from the definition of the narrow concept of an employee under an employment contract used in the context of individual labour relations.

This chapter argues that European Union (EU) law is heavily dependent on the effective protection of collective labour rights in the member states. Where that protection falls short, both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of EU law may be undermined. This chapter looks at the potential problems that might arise as a result of the EU's reliance on the member states to protect collective labour rights. It also examines whether there is a real risk of a member state failing to protect collective labour rights. Furthermore, it assesses whether the EU's existing involvement in collective labour rights is sufficient to guard against the risks. Later, it is argued that the EU ought to have the power to set minimum standards on collective labour rights in the member states. Finally, this chapter considers whether giving the EU this power would be consistent with the doctrine of subsidiarity.

This article explores the issues of subordination and authority in the contemporary world of work as they are exacerbated by new forms of work-surveillance that track emotions and mental states of workers by means of artificial intelligence, predictive algorithms and big data. It discusses subordination in contemporary work arrangements, highlighting how new technologies and business practices expand hierarchy and forms of private government beyond the scope of the employment relationship. It explores some of the technologies and practices that magnify and expand managerial powers to unprecedented levels, by tracking and strictly monitoring workers’ emotional and mental states. It also highlights how collective labour rights represent the best counterbalance to restrain these practices and curb modern forms of private government in the workplace. It concludes by discussing how the distinction between the traditional functions of collective rights, the ‘civil liberty’ and the ‘industrial’ function is increasingly blurred, arguing that an expansion of the personal scope of collective rights is crucial in this regard. Workplace Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Predictive Algorithms, Big Data, Platform Work, Surveillance Capitalism, Subordination, Contract of Employment, Collective Labour Rights

The paper addresses the issue of self-employed platform workers’ access to collective labour rights from the perspective of international law (ILO) and supranational European law (EU and Council of Europe). In this regard, the paper addresses the right to collective bargaining, the right to strike and the collective right to information and consultation. The main finding is that at the current stage, the relevant international and European legal framework is not providing access of self-employed platform workers to all examined collective labour rights. In light of the analysed legal developments the binary divide “has fallen” (for those self-employed platform workers who fulfil the 2022 Guidelines criteria) regarding access to collective bargaining. Therefore, as argued in the paper, also access to the right to strike should be ensured for the latter platform workers due to the purposeful interconnectedness and inseparability of both rights. Nonetheless, the binary divide is remaining “firm” regarding access to collective information and consultation rights. The latter remain accessible (including considering the Platform Work Directive proposal) only to platform workers with a subordinate “worker” status. However, as argued in the paper, the possibility to drop the binary divide (at least regarding certain matters) also in relation to collective information and consultation rights (in the context of platform work) should be seriously considered.

The spread of non-standard forms of employment in industrialised and developing countries over the last decades has prompted an extensive debate on how to reshape labour regulation to accommodate these new formats. However, limited attention has been devoted to the access of non-standard workers to fundamental labour rights. This chapter aims at reorienting the debate towards these neglected dimensions of labour regulation. In particular, it focuses on the risks affecting work in the so-called ‘gig’ or ‘platform’ economy, since the relative novelty of these forms of work may obscure the difficulties these workers face in enjoying fundamental labour rights. Platform workers, together with casual workers and some self-employed workers not only are more exposed to violations of fundamental rights but are also often excluded from the legal scope of application of these rights, which are sometimes reserved to workers in an employment relationship. This is particularly true for collective labour rights, as self-employed workers, including sham self-employed persons and platform workers, who are often deprived of full access to the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. This happens, for instance, when their collective activities are found to be in breach of antitrust regulation. This chapter maintains that preventing self-employed workers who do not own a genuine and significant business organisation from bargaining collectively is at odds with the recognition of the right to collective bargaining as a human and a fundamental right. Consequently, it argues that only self-employed individuals who do not provide ‘labour’ but instead provide services using an independent, genuine and significant business organisation that they own and manage can have their right to bargain collectively restricted.

The spread of non-standard forms of employment in industrialised and developing countries over the last decades has prompted an extensive debate on how to reshape labour regulation to accommodate these new formats. However, limited attention has been devoted to the access of non-standard workers to fundamental labour rights. This chapter aims at reorienting the debate towards these neglected dimensions of labour regulation. In particular, it focuses on the risks affecting work in the so-called ‘gig’ or ‘platform’ economy, since the relative novelty of these forms of work may obscure the difficulties these workers face in enjoying fundamental labour rights. Platform workers, together with casual workers and some self-employed workers not only are more exposed to violations of fundamental rights but are also often excluded from the legal scope of application of these rights, which are sometimes reserved to workers in an employment relationship. This is particularly true for collective labour rights, as self-employed workers, including sham self-employed persons and platform workers, who are often deprived of full access to the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. This happens, for instance, when their collective activities are found to be in breach of antitrust regulation. This chapter maintains that preventing self-employed workers who do not own a genuine and significant business organisation from bargaining collectively is at odds with the recognition of the right to collective bargaining as a human and a fundamental right. Consequently, it argues that only self-employed individuals who do not provide ‘labour’ but instead provide services using an independent, genuine and significant business organisation that they own and manage can have their right to bargain collectively restricted.

This study argues that institutionalized authoritarian states, those with established political parties and legislatures, tend to pursue a two-pronged strategy concerning labor rights: they severely restrict collective labor rights but moderately protect substantive labor rights at the same time. This argument leads to an expectation of a decoupling between collective labor rights protection and substantive labor rights protection in institutionalized autocracies, or a strategic bifurcation. Using a novel global panel data on labor rights, it finds that (1) institutionalized authoritarianism does not protect collective labor rights better than noninstitutionalized authoritarianisms, (2) institutionalized authoritarianism protects substantive labor rights more than noninstitutionalized authoritarianisms, and (3) better protection of collective labor rights has no impact on the protection of substantive labor rights under institutionalized authoritarianism. The findings remain largely robust to alternative estimators, measures, reduced samples, and model specifications.

This chapter considers the use by the European Union (EU) of sustainable development objectives in the promotion of trade-labour linkages. The first part reviews conditions for EU tariff preferences and trade agreements connected to 'core' International Labour Organization (ILO) labour rights, including freedom of association and collective bargaining, under the rubric of sustainable development. The second part considers how the EU can be regarded as a 'conflicted actor' regarding collective labour rights and notes tentative steps taken towards to a more assertive EU trade strategy. The third analyses key aspects of the EU-Korea Expert Panel findings in 2021, which indicate the potential reach of a sustainable development approach. While the Korean response to the Panel Report may not seem promising, further EU internal market policy proposals may offer the basis for the EU to be regarded as a 'good' rather than merely an 'assertive' actor.

This article considers the future development of the constitutionalization of labour rights, in particular non-discrimination rights and collective labour rights, within the European Union's legal order following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and in light of the EU's impending accession to the Council of Europe. The accession throws a spotlight on the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The two courts' respective interpretations of certain labour rights contain elements of overlap and, in some respects, conflict which will presumably have to be reconciled under the new legal order within which the courts will find themselves. It is argued that the constitutionalization of labour rights would offer some important protections that should be fundamentally guaranteed and thus available to all workers but which are under threat due to transnational changes resulting from globalization. Furthermore, as the case law analysis demonstrates, the traditional hierarchy of rights by which civil and political rights were prioritized over their economic and social counterparts, has given way to an EU legal order whereby the economic imperative remains paramount, with social provisions, in the context of labour rights, subjugated and subject to further divisions.

Since 2010, multiple waves of EU/IMF-imposed legislative reforms have led to extensive deregulation or ‘de-construction’ of Greek collective labour law. While there are many accounts of the Greek reforms, no systematic attention has been devoted to the following paradox: how is such a de-construction possible, in a jurisdiction enjoying a strong domestic constitutionalisation of labour rights, and apparently observing multiple transnational collective labour rights, derived from the CFREU, ECHR, and ILO Conventions? This article sets out to investigate the constitutional dynamics behind the process termed here as ‘de-constitutionalisation’ of collective labour rights. It seeks to add two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, taking its cue from Eric Tucker’s mapping of multi-level ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ constitutions developed in the Canadian context, it suggests that the Greek case of de-constitutionalisation is the cumulative result of a specific configuration of interactions between ‘aggressive’ EU-IMF conditionality at the level of transnational capital rights, and ‘defensive’ articulation of labour rights at domestic and transnational levels. As will be seen, these interactions disguise an asymmetric clash between a strong constutionalisation of capital rights at transnational level, and a weak constitutionalisation of labour rights at both transnational and domestic levels. Secondly, the article projects the Greek case onto the broader constitutionalisation debate, which questions the desirability of constitutionalising collective labour rights as an effective response to neo-liberal policies and laws. While submitting that the Greek developments support the sceptical side of this debate, in particular by providing a continental European confirmation of Tucker’s thesis, the article offers several new reflections of relevance to the constitutionalisation debate.

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.