Abstract
Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions (conventions, social norms, legal rules) are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality.
Highlights
Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team
I build on this point to discuss, in the fourth section, the recent critique of Searle’s account by Smit, Buekens, and du Plessis (2011) who argue that an economic explanation of institutions does not need a concept of collective intentionality
I have presented a framework for introducing collective intentionality into game theory
Summary
Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. This concept embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game and can be related to Searle’s collective intentionality.
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