Abstract
We re-examine the problem of fair division in situations when the number of individuals involved may increase but the resources at their disposal remain fixed. We introduce the notion of collective guarantee structure to measure the protection offered to initial groups in such circumstances. We show that the Nash solution offers better protection than any weakly Pareto-optimal and anonymous solution.
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